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The present paper seeks to explain how ethics and values in public policy can be result of 
different historical contingencies. Specifically, it explains the accomplishment of petroleum 
resource management in Norway. The main argument is that the success of this policy is an 
understanding of the ethics behind harvesting the resource rent of this non-renewable natural 
resource.  
To support the argument, the paper firstly describes a model of Recardian resource rent. 
Secondly, it investigates the set of values that were in place before the petroleum production 
started in the 1970s, as described in the influential white paper, “The role of petroleum 
activities in the Norwegian Society,” published in 1974. In the white paper, the government 
discussed the future opportunities, challenges, and responsibilities associated with the oil 
industry and how this would transform society. An important part of the white paper revealed 
the main ethical vision of the government, i.e., to build a “qualitatively better society” for the 
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“Norwegians have always looked to the state to help manage their 
abundant natural resources – minerals, fjords, forests, waterfalls – and 
to look after isolated and thinly spread communities.” 
(The Economist, 2013, pp. 13–14) 
 
Norway has, for more than 50 years, produced oil and gas. In 2017, petroleum extraction 
constituted 14 percent of the gross domestic product, 17 percent of the state’s income, 
nineteen percent of total investments and 40 percent of the total export value 
(Oljedirektoratet, 2018). Norway exports huge quantities of crude oil and is the world’s third 
largest exporter of natural gas, supplying approximately 25 percent of the demand for gas in 
the EU. Contrary to many other natural resource abundant countries, it has avoided the 
resource curse because of its strong institutions. Overall, the Norwegian management of the 
revenues from these resources have been accomplishments benefiting the entire nation. This 
paper contributes to our understanding of this success from an ethical and resource rent 
perspective. 
During the first half of the 1970s, one seemed to have a reasonable understanding of 
how the petroleum resources could be used to benefit the society. The foundation, stems from 
the understanding of petroleum as a non-renewable natural resource one could harvest 
resource rent from. Thus, they should be handled in a beneficiary and ethical way. These 
views were presented in an influential white paper, “The role of petroleum activities in the 
Norwegian society” (Finansdepartementet, 1974). The paper laid the foundation for the 
public debate on how the petroleum revenues should be used and what effect the petroleum 
activities would have on society. Many topics requiring ethical considerations were 
presented, including sustainability issues. The most fundamental being the concept of 
“building a qualitatively better society.”  
Both politicians and government officials were afraid of what this new wealth would do 
to the society. This reserved attitude can be illustrated by the following quote: “Everything I 
said was met with ‘Oh, you think so? Mmm. Maybe. Let’s wait and see’,” al-Kasim recalls. 
“This characteristic saved Norway from the curse of oil: the fact that they are completely 
incapable of getting carried away by the oil dream. They were skeptical – plain horse sense 
basically. They didn’t want to move until it was absolutely proven that it was the right time to 
act” (Sandbu, 2009). 
The institutional setting in Norway in the 1960s was very different from most oil 
countries, especially developing countries. “Oil companies, especially eager to exploit 
resources outside of the OPEC’s dominion, did not encounter a poor country, a weak state, 
undeveloped social forces, or a predatory, authoritarian ruler. Instead, Norway was already a 
wealthy, equitable, and democratic country (Karl, 1997, p. 216). 
The present paper shows that a handful of government officials, who first started to 
discuss and design the petroleum policy during the 1960s, represented a continuation of 
public values with historical roots. It also claims that because they faced a new natural 
resource that could have a substantial effect on society, they were forced to act prudently. 
To better understand the “civil servant state” and the zeitgeist of the 1960s, the paper 
addresses critical historical events that shaped these values: the long tradition of managing 
natural resources, the Concession laws, and the origin of state ownership. The latter being a 
significant factor in the country’s public policy since the 19th century.  
However, substantial state ownership raises a dilemma. On one hand, the state has 






pursuing broader social goals than just profit-seeking. “The dilemma of the Norwegian state 
is this dual role as a commercial player and a political regulator, and nowhere is this dilemma 
more acute than in the petroleum industry” (Østerud, 2005, p. 708). In addition, one should 




2. Resource Rent model 
The extraction of oil and gas gives a profit on the use of non-renewable resources, stemming 
from the resources themselves. This profit is called resource rent, in line with Ricardo’s 
definition of land rent, which is the profit one receives from the soil by utilizing it. The 
resource rent is understood as an extra profit given by the natural resources. Hence, one may 
define resource rent equal to the value of capital services rendered by natural resources, or 
their share in the gross operating surplus. Its value is given by the value of extraction.   
The Ricardian resource rent is explained in Figure 1. Long-term marginal costs, i.e., the 
supply curve for a normal product is considered to be constant, and thus, given by 𝑐𝐴
′ . When 
for a natural resource one assumes that one has to use increasing marginal long-term costs in 
order to increase production. Hence, the supply curve for a natural resource is given by 𝑐𝑅
′ . If 
one increases demand according to the demand curve, D, in a normal product market, the 
production volume increases from 𝑥0 to ?̂?, when prices remain stable at 𝑝0. In a natural 
resource market, however, the new equilibrium will be at price level ?̅? and at production 
volume ?̅?. The resource rent will be equivalent to the blue triangle in figure 1. 
 




It is common to define the assets of natural resources as the net present value of expected 
future use of the resources, i.e., future resource rent. In order to calculate the value of the 
resource assets one needs the volume of production, product prices and costs. The production 
of oil and gas as non-renewable resources is in fact a way to consume the resource assets.  
If one defines the resource asset, W, at the departure, 0, as 𝑊0
∗ as the net present value 
of future resource rent with an optimal extraction of the resources, 𝑢0
∗ , ..... , 𝑢∞
∗ . With 
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where  is the discount rate. If one assumes that the real extraction of the natural resource is 
different from the optimal, i.e.,  𝑢0 ≠ 𝑢0
∗ , the resource asset will change from 𝑊1
∗ to 𝑊1
′ at 
time 1. Hence, the real asset at time 0,  𝑊0
′, will now be: 
 
𝑊0
′ = 𝑝𝑢0 + (1 + )
−1𝑊1
′      (2) 
 
Thus, the loss in resource asset due to non-optimal extraction of it can be found by deducting 
equation (2) from equation (1): 
 
(𝑊0
∗ −  𝑊0
′) = [𝑝𝑢0
∗ + (1 + )−1𝑊1
∗] − [𝑝𝑢0 + (1 + )
−1𝑊1
′]  (3) 
 




∗ −  𝑊0
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∗ − 𝑊1
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The definition implies that 𝑊0
∗ −  𝑊0
′ > 0. 
 
This means that it is of great importance for the government to utilize the resource rent, and 
thus, the resource asset in a way that seems as optimal as possible for their electorate. Thus, 
in an institutional democracy, it will be important to monitor the resource assets and extract 
resources, thereby optimizing the resource rent in a way that seems ethical for their 
population. 
 
Presently oil and gas production on the Norwegian continental is billed with 22 percent in 
ordinary taxes and 56 percent in resource rent tax, 78 percent in total. The historical 
development is shown in figure 2, where special taxes and royalties and fees can be 
considered resource rent taxation. Due to COVID-19 the companies have paid and are paying 
significantly less tax in 2020 and 2021 respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Taxes from oil and gas extractions in Norway 1971-2021, billion NOK 2021 values. 
 
Source, https://www.norskpetroleum.no/okonomi/petroleumsskatt/ 
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3. Building a “qualitatively better society” 
In the late 1960s senior civil servants took the first steps in discussing and designing the 
policy the state should follow with respect to its petroleum policy. Approaching the 1970s, 
the government seemed to have a good understanding of how the petroleum resources could 
be used to benefit the entire society.  
 
3.1. The “uninteresting question” 
In the early 1960s, Norway was not ready for the petroleum age by any standard. Very few 
believed that there would be any petroleum in the North Sea, and the theme was considered 
uninteresting. However, when the Phillips Petroleum Company approached the Norwegian 
authorities in 1962, requesting for a concession for the entire North Sea, the Foreign Office 
approved. They were uncertain regarding the answer and the negotiations with Denmark and 
UK about the borders dividing the North Sea had not yet been resolved. Additionally, they 
did not possess any specific knowledge about the particular industry. 
The offer from Phillips was not accepted, and they were not granted a sole concession. 
Instead, the lawyers in the Foreign Office researched Norwegian law and history and studied 
how natural resources had been managed as common resources. As a result, on June 21st, 
1963 the state issued a law (The law on exploration and use of subsea natural resources) in 
which article five stated, “The (property) right to subsea natural resources belongs to the 
state”. This simple article unquestionably stated that it was the state who legally had the 
property rights to the potential petroleum resources in the North Sea. At the same time, the 
article not only established the state as the primary stakeholder but also paved the way for the 
state to take an active role in the oil business. 
How should we understand this argument? Part of the answer lies in the postwar 
zeitgeist. Their values represented a continuation of historical lines. One presumed that if 
there were any petroleum resources, the extraction will include resource rent, and the value of 
this should benefit the people. Postwar Norway was “characterized by developing the welfare 
state, and it is in this light we must understand how they were thinking. Even though there 
was no single discovered drop of oil on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, they prepared a 
policy where the future oil resource could be used as a tool to develop Norway further” 
(Skredderberget, 2015, p. 32). In short, the state should be in control, and the property rights 
to the petroleum resources should not be sold to private companies. The resource rent should 
benefit the people. However, this did not exclude using private companies in exploration and 
production, but the state should take part and exercise control of all steps in the supply chain. 
 
3.2. The 10 oil commandments 
After the discovery of the Ekofisk oil field in 1969, it became clear that the country would 
become an oil nation. However, the government seemed to be reluctant to accept this and 
proceeded with caution. The discovery also forced the politicians to take the formerly 
“uninteresting question” seriously and discuss the challenges and opportunities ahead. In 
1970 and 1971, white papers discussing the petroleum questions were issued 
(Industridepartementet, 1970, 1971).  
On the basis of these, the Standing Committee on Industry issued a Recommendation to 
the Parliament, including ten commandments laying out the principles for the Norwegian 
petroleum policy (Industrikomité, 1971). The committee’s recommendation builds upon the 
following two fundamental principles: (1) the state is the owner of the petroleum resources 
and (2) “these natural resources should be used in such a way that they benefit the entire 







Table 1. The ten oil commandments to ensure efficient utilization of resource rent from 
Norwegian petroleum reserves. 
1. National supervision and control must be ensured for all operations on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf (NCS). 
2. Petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a way that makes Norway as independent as possible of 
others for its supplies of crude oil. 
3. A new industry will be developed on the basis of petroleum. 
4. The development of an oil industry must take necessary account of the existing industrial activities 
and the protection of nature and the environment. 
5. Flaring of exploitable gas on the NCS must not be accepted except during brief periods of testing. 
6. Petroleum from the NCS must, as a rule, be landed in Norway, except in those cases where socio-
political considerations dictate a different solution. 
7. The state must become involved at all appropriate levels and contribute to a coordination of 
Norwegian interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the creation of an integrated oil 
community that sets its sights both nationally and internationally. 
8. A state oil company will be established that can look after the government’s commercial interests 
and pursue appropriate collaboration with domestic and foreign oil interests. 
9. A pattern of activities must be selected north of the 62nd parallel that reflects the special 
sociopolitical conditions prevailing in that part of the country. 
10. Large Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks for Norway’s foreign policy. 
Source: http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Norwegian-Continental-Shelf/No2-2010/10-commanding-achievements/ 
 
The most important point in the commandments, is the role of the state. The state should be 
in control of the petroleum resources and be active in all parts of the industry, including the 
establishment of a state-owned oil company, Statoil. This implied that the state adopted roles 
both as landlord and entrepreneur (Austvik, 2012). Secondly, the petroleum resources should 
be used to develop a new industry, when protecting the environment at the same time 
(commandment no 4). The discussion regarding the potential danger to the environment was 
at the initial phase short and restricted to the part of transporting the oil from the sea to land. 
Thirdly, exploration in the North Sea had so far been restricted to areas south of the 62. 
parallel.  
However, the white papers address the question regarding whether oil exploration 
should be allowed north of the 62. parallel, on condition that these areas had to be developed 
in a unique manner, protecting the vulnerable arctic environment and the relationship with the 
Soviet Union (commandments no 9 and 10). It is evident from the white papers that there was 
increasing political pressure to allow exploration north of the 62. parallel, in order to create 
jobs in the northern parts of the country (Bjørklund, 2008, 2009). In 1979, the Norwegian 
parliament granted exploration concessions for selected fields north of the 62. parallel. 
 
3.3. White paper “The role of petroleum activities in the Norwegian society” 
The most important white paper was published in 1974 with the title “The role of petroleum 
activities in the Norwegian society” (Finansdepartementet, 1974). The white paper was of 
immense importance, presenting a starting point for the public debate in the years to come: 
“The Government is aiming to lay a foundation for a broad debate about the petroleum policy 
in all parts of the Norwegian people” (p.5*). It provided an overview to several dimensions of 
how these activities could affect both Norway and its relation to other countries: (1) 
Democracy and control; (2) International perspectives; (3) The use of the resources; (4) 







3.3.1. The fundamental question is ethical 
The most fundamental question in the white paper was: how should the country spend the oil 
money? The government’s answer was to build “a qualitatively better society”. “The 
economic opportunities must be used to create greater equality in the living standard … to 
prevent social problems, and to develop a more environmental and resource-friendly 
production” (p. 6*). In other words, an environmentally friendly welfare state should be 
further developed, and all use of petroleum revenues should “be part of a planned 
transformation of the Norwegian society” (p. 6*). Even gender equality was brought into the 
petroleum policy (Hunnes & Grytten, 2012). While the white paper acknowledges that the 
nation was to become very wealthy, the government urged caution and to be slow in 
extracting the petroleum resources. By using time carefully, one could delay and spread the 
revenues over time to avoid a massive demand shock to the domestic economy, and at the 
same time transforming the society in a controlled manner. 
The white paper emphasized the role of the state in all phases of the petroleum value 
chain. The focus on the state’s role was historical and reflected a renewed nationalism after 
the 1972-referendum, when Norway declined to become a member of the European 
Community. The state represented the people: “The people have to elect bodies which must 
have control of all important aspects of the petroleum policy” (p. 9*). As part of this policy 
the white paper signaled that the state could use part of the oil revenue to increase its 
ownership in private companies. Critical in this respect was the establishment of the state oil 
company Statoil, which should take part in every activity in the supply chain and every 
concession. It should simultaneously compete in the global oil business and be a political tool 
for the Parliament and the government in ensuring social responsibility and to pursuing profit.  
The white paper included warnings against spending the petroleum revenues too fast and for 
consumption only. The argument was avoiding a macroeconomic shock, but ethical questions 
were also present “for the sake of future generations” (p. 17*). The white paper is the first 
place where it is explicitly stated that part of the oil revenues could be invested abroad. We 
can interpret this as being the seed for the Norwegian sovereign fund, i.e., the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund – Global (NGPF). 
The white paper (p. 10*) also addressed potential future conflicts in interests and values 
between different (1) countries and Norway; (2) social groups within the society; (3) sectors 
in the economy; and (4) generations. Hence, it was important to avoid policies where the 
special interests of one group of stakeholders dominate.  
 
3.3.2. The Oil Fund 
To avoid Dutch disease, i.e., high inflation due to a rapid increase in currency income, and to 
secure the resource rent revenue for the future generations the NGPF was founded in 1990 
and came into operation in 1996. The fund is where the surplus revenues of Norwegian 
petroleum extraction is deposited. Thus, it is commonly referred to as the Oil Fund.  
The establishment mirrors the idea that the extraction of oil and gas is consumption of 
the national asset of a non-renewable resource. Aiming at increasing the value, the money is 
invested abroad, and one is supposed to use the net returns only, annually expected to three 
percent of its value. This is a careful measure as the historical returns until 2020 in current 










Figure 3. Value of the Norwegian Pension Fund – Global, in billion US$ 
 
Source, (Norges Bank, 2021) 
 
As seen from figure 3 the growth of the fund has been tremendous, with the highest growth 
for stocks, which by the end of 2020 accounted for 72.8 percent, followed by interest 
investments with 24.7 percent and property with 2.5 percent. 
In 1998 the fund’s value was 16.9 percent of the GDP of mainland-Norway. By the end 
of 2020, it was close to 360 percent, as shown in figure 4. Early in 2017 the returns of the 
capital of the fund for the first time exceeded the capital input. The latter has since 2013 been 
shrinking compared to GDP. This is indicating that the net revenue from oil and gas 
extraction is in decline, and that in the future the returns or rent on the investments will be the 
key provider to the fund. A weaker Norwegian currency during the last years, partly due to 
less income from petroleum, has contributed significantly to the increasing value of the fund. 
In 2020 this contribution reached 47.6 percent of mainland GDP, compared to 99.9 percent 
from capital input and 211.3 percent from returns on investments. The NGPF has truly 
proven to be successful stewardship of the resource rent in petroleum extraction. 
 
Figure 4. Value of the Norwegian Pension Fund – Global, ratio to mainland GDP. 
 
Source, (Norges Bank, 2021; Grytten, 2020) 
 























































































































































































































In previous white papers, the government addressed briefly environmental issues, mostly 
focusing on direct pollution of oil into the sea and land. In “The role of petroleum activities in 
the Norwegian society,” the discussion became significantly broader. “Economic growth 
must […] be given a new meaning […] so that it contributes to the sensible use of resources 
and does not destroy the fundamental balance in nature” (p. 15*). There is no clear answer 
given to what this ‘new content’ should be. However, preventing negative consequences of 
petroleum activities were given higher priority than before. Furthermore, the government 
advises a slow or moderate extraction pace, which would make environmental protection 
more manageable. Norway established the first governmental Ministry of Environment in 
1972. 
Fisheries have always been an essential part of the Norwegian economy. Hence, there is 
a particular concern regarding how the petroleum activities will affect the fish resources. 
Some of the most critical and sensitive fish banks are located north of the 62. parallel. The 
implicit question was how much risk of damaging the environment is society willing to 
accept for extracting oil. A complicating factor was that both the US and Russia had strategic 
military interests in this part of the sea, especially during the Cold War era, 1947–1991. 
 
3.3.4. Taking international responsibility 
The ethical question about sharing part of the petroleum wealth with developing countries 
was an important point to address for some of the political parties, particularly for the 
Christian Democrats (KrF): (1) “It is not acceptable that the main part of the oil revenue is 
used to increase our domestic standard of living. We have a moral obligation to see this in 
view of the poverty and distress in which a too large proportion of humanity lives under” 
(Hanisch & Nerheim, 1992, p. 414); (2) “We should acknowledge strong stewardship for the 
oil revenues because it is wealth we manage on behalf of many more than just ourselves” 
(Finanskomiteen, 1974, p. 19). 
From reading the transcript of parliamentary debates, it is clear that politicians across 
the political spectrum addressed the ethical obligation attached to the new wealth. Indeed, the 
white paper itself acknowledged this as follows: “we have a special responsibility in a world 
characterized by fundamental economic and social inequality. We should, therefore, provide 
the countries that need it the most with part of the increased income” (p. 14*). One of the 
primary mechanisms to achieve this was to fulfill the objective of using one percent of GDP 
in foreign aid.  
 
3.3.5. Yes, we are going to be rich. However, we don’t like it (yet)! 
It is not easy to summarize “The role of petroleum activities in the Norwegian society”. It 
addresses welfare levels, egalitarianism, social problems, different stakeholders, the 
environment, ethics and values, societal changes, local communities, rural policy, taxation, 
work life, economy, consumption, investment, foreign policy, and foreign aid. The 
government wanted a broad discussion involving different parts of society.  
Huge personal wealth has hardly been comfortable in the Norwegian mentality. 
Historically, the country did not have a wealthy nobility as one would find in most of Europe. 
Instead, the prevailing value was egalitarianism. In this light, it seems natural that there is a 
general sentiment in the white paper warning against the future wealth and a concern 
regarding how this will change society. However, Noreng (1984) is very critical of the 
discussion and the white paper itself and claims that it was more than a policy paper. 
 
“Morally and politically the discussion was typically in line with the old pattern of thought. 






circles, oil money in itself was seen as evil. In part, this expressed a puritan attitude, with an 
emotional fear of being morally corrupted by quick and easy wealth. […] This was the reason 
why the government did not dare to give the Norwegian people greater wealth alone, but only 
together with a morally sound and politically correct package. This package was called ‘a 
qualitatively better society’. […] a program for changing the Norwegian society in a direction 
inspired by a socialist and populistic thought” (Noreng, 1984, pp. 79–80). 
 
The Parliament embraced the goal of building “a qualitatively better society.” The problem 
was different interpretations of the concept. There was a significant division between the left 
and the right. The left wanted an extensive and strong state control, while the right wanted to 
give private companies a larger role and responsibility in the North Sea. One right-wing 
politician stated the following: “In our opinion, the great weakness of the white paper is that, 
in some ways, it assumes that everyone agrees that only the state can handle the challenges. 
One cannot imagine that there are other solutions” (Stortingstidende, 1974, p. 3545). The 
suggested petroleum policy was a continuation of the “strong-state-policy” established after 
the war. 
Another critical point was how fast one should extract the oil. A high extraction pace 
could have a very damaging effect on the Norwegian economy and make it more difficult for 
the state to be in control. The prevailing sentiment among the government was to focus on the 
long-run and move slowly in developing the petroleum industry. Among Norway’s trading 
partners, this was not well received because they had experienced a fourfold increase in the 
oil price during the 1970s. However, Norwegian authorities made it clear that Norway’s 
interests from now on were to be associated with those of oil exporting countries, including 
the OPEC countries, and not with the interests of oil importing countries. 
The white paper, “The role of petroleum activities in the Norwegian society,” laid the 
foundation for the public debate on how the resource rent in the form of revenues from oil 
and gas extraction should be used and what effect the petroleum activities would have on 
society. Did the country achieve its objective of building a qualitatively better society? 
Hanisch and Nerheim answer “yes” in their book on Norwegian oil history (Hanisch & 
Nerheim, 1992). They look at social policy during the 1970s, e.g., retirement age, weekly 
working hours, the law on the working environment, sick leave benefits, and increased labor 
participation among married women. All of these variables improved. One also finds 
economic convergence between rural and central areas.  
Internationally, the prudent Norwegian petroleum policy gained recognition. In 1975, 
the Economist included a survey on Norway, and wrote: “Norway’s success so far in 
capitalizing on its anticipated oil revenues, […] has owed a great deal to the managerial skills 
of those responsible for steering the economy” (The Economist, 1975b, p. 7). The success 
was attributed to “steering the economy” in the tradition of the Norwegian economist Frisch 
(1895–1873), who won the first Nobel prize in economic science in 1969. In an earlier survey 
on the North Sea oil, the same magazine stated that “Norway’s oil policy has been 
characterized by a clarity, consistency and the ability to learn from past mistakes...” Further, 
the British Government “is now a great admirer of the Norwegian approach” (The Economist, 
1975a, pp. 26, 18). 
However, the white paper reveals a fundamental dilemma. On one hand, petroleum will 
give the nation almost unlimited financial opportunities. On the other hand, the revenues may 
affect the inflation pressure, economy and work mentality. Thus, one argued for moving 
slowly forward. A member of parliament even asked: “Should Norway be an oil nation or a 







4. Historical roots 
This section investigates historical roots of the ethical values that shaped the petroleum 
policy. The discussion is made along two main arguments. Firstly, that there is a close 
connection between Norway’s natural resources, economy, and institutions. In several cases, 
the institutions have been established as a direct consequence of managing the natural 
resources. The focus is put at the Concessions laws and state ownership in general. Another 
important aspect is cooperation between the public and private sectors. To understand this, 
the paper examines the impact of the troubling interwar years and the labor movement during 
the 1930s. Secondly, the paper addresses the public’s trust in a strong, noncorrupt state. 
 
4.1. Natural resources and institutions 
The Norwegian economy has always utilized natural resources for domestic use and exports. 
Forestry, fisheries, and waterfalls have been especially important. Fisheries and forestry were 
already regulated before the mid-18th century to prevent exhaustion of the resources. There 
was a popular understanding of the need to regulate and preserve the renewable natural 
resources to avoid exhaustion. This dependence between natural resources and the economy 
has contributed to three institutional characteristics of the domestic business system: 
 
“Firstly, significant local and regional variations in the business system have emerged because 
people have adapted their economic activities, their local institutions and ways of organizing 
to the differences in the resource endowment. Secondly, the wide distribution of natural 
resources combined with topographic limits to strong centralized political and economic 
governance have promoted relatively autonomous and economically active local 
communities. Thirdly, the often-high resource rent and high value of the natural resources 
have promoted the state to intervene in the economy, through regulations, economic support 
or ownership.” (Thue, 2008, p. 395) 
 
In addition to the importance of the natural resources per se, a critical point in understanding 
the governing of these resources is the fact that Norway is a relatively young state, founded in 
1814. Between 1380 and 1814, the country was in reality a colony under Denmark and was 
governed from Copenhagen (the so-called ‘400-year night’). Thereafter, it stayed 
independent, but in a personnel union under the Swedish king until 1905. 
The longing for independence from foreign political control and interference created a 
fear of giving up sovereignty, territory, and resources. Further, being under foreign political 
control created a sense of nationalism. Both in 1972 and 1994, Norway voted ‘no’ in 
referendums to join the European Union.  
 
4.1.1. The Concessions laws 
Norway was a late-comer in the industrialization process during the 19th century, but “was 
not peripheral from a social, political, cultural or educational perspective. It “became both 
socially and politically a free society, and […] was deeply imbued by a Puritan Protestant 
ethic” (Berend, 2013, pp. 241, 242; Grytten & Minde, 2019, pp. 244-256). The waterfalls, 
which were generating hydroelectric power, became the decisive factor in the 
industrialization process. They were of interest to domestic and foreign industrial companies 
in need of access to cheap, electrical power. Much of the extraction of Norwegian natural 
resources relied heavily on “foreign initiative, skill and capital” (Moses, 2005, p. 36). This 
was perceived as a growing problem throughout the 19th century as national awareness and 






In 1906, the government issued a law preventing foreign purchase of Norwegian 
waterfalls. This was soon extended to include forests and mining. Firstly, the government 
could issue concessions to foreign companies, and later, also to private Norwegian 
companies. A key point in the Concessions laws was that the concession lasted for 60 to 80 
years, after which ownership was handed over to the state at no cost. 
The concession laws created a heated political debate. Some argued that this was a 
significant change in industrial policy moving away from a liberal system, while others 
welcomed the change that made the country gain better control of the resource rent from the 
waterfalls. Lange writes that “the debate about the laws and the form they received revealed 
the existence of highly negative attitudes towards private capitalistic activity in leading 
political circles” (Lange, 1977, p. 314). Hence, the discussions of the concessions laws 
between 1906 and 1918 can be interpreted as a struggle between classical liberalism and a 
more active and regulatory state (Slagstad, 2001; Thue, 2008). 
It is essential to understand this event for at least four reasons. Firstly, the concession 
laws expressed both a national skepticism regarding foreign ownership and domestic private 
ownership of common resources. Secondly, they created a role for the state in managing 
natural resources that was in line with the public sentiment at the time. Thirdly, the laws 
required the use of domestic labor and materials, and foreign firms were encouraged to 
support the domestic industry. Fourthly, they were used as inspiration when Norway 
discovered its petroleum resources. Hence, “[i]t is hard to exaggerate the influence that these 
concession laws had on subsequent developments, […and after discovering petroleum] these 
same laws were used to secure a central position for Norwegian firms until they became 
strong enough to fend off international competitors” (Moses, 2005, p. 37).  
 
4.1.2. State ownership 
A critical factor in Norway during the 20th century was the active role of the state in 
developing the society, facilitating, and investing in industrial development, especially in 
investing in infrastructure. The industrialization and modernization of the Norwegian society 
were directed by the state and were led by a group of senior public servants. “The idea that 
the state should actively use its resources to facilitate economic activity was established and 
maintained for generations” (Lie, Myklebust, & Norvik, 2014, p. 46). This idea was 
strengthened after the Second World War, when Norway, like most West-European countries, 
gained belief in government planning and governance.  
“If democracy was to work, if it was to recover its appeal, it would have to be 
planned,” writes Judt (2010, p. 67). This was not as detailed planning as in the Soviet Union. 
Instead, the state took part in “social and economic affairs. Beyond this, there were great 
variations, usually a consequence of distinctive national political traditions” (Judt, 2010, p. 
69). Historians claim that Norway was perhaps the country where the trust and belief in state 
intervention were strongest among the Western countries.  
The discovery of petroleum gave the state new opportunities for taking an active part in 
business.  
The banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s gave opportunities for the state to enter 
commercial banking. Today, the state “is a predominant actor in the Norwegian industrial 
sector”, with “direct ownership of the oil resources on the Norwegian continental shelf.” (Lie, 
2016, p. 904). Lie explains the extent of state ownership, drawing on three major arguments: 
“a high level of trust in the state as a protector of common interests, a persistent lack of 
robust private investors, and a strong inclination to avoid a powerful foreign influence in the 






Lie builds this argument on the work of Sejersted, who shows that, during the 19th 
century, Norway, unlike its neighboring countries, did not develop a strong elite (Sejersted, 
1993, p. 171). “The Norwegian Sonderweg is characterized by the weakness of big business 
and the corresponding strength of the democratic petite bourgeoisie” (Sejersted, 2011, p. 11). 
This “petite bourgeoisie” did not have the capacity to rise large sums of capital. Thus, the 
state provided capital and take an active part in the industrial development. Its role was 
pragmatic; the objective was to use the state’s resources to solve specific problems in the 
society (Lie, 2016, p. 912). 
 
4.1.3. The labor movement 
From the 1920s, the labor movement gained a solid position in Norwegian politics. Between 
1935 and 1981, the Labor Party was in Cabinet except for one month in 1963 and in the years 
1965–71 and 1972–73. The party even had the majority in the Parliament until the 1960s. The 
terms ‘the Labor Party State’ and ‘the One-Party State’ are used to describe the position. 
The years between the 1930s and the 1970s were formative for what we today consider the 
Nordic model, which is an economic system with a mix of socialist thinking and market 
economy, governed by a welfare state. Even if the Labor Party was in front molding the 
welfare state, it should be noted that (1) this was part of an international movement, and (2) 
there was support for introducing welfare benefits across the political spectrum (Gulbrandsen 
& Engelstad, 2005; Østerud, 2005; Gulbrandsen, 2007). 
Norwegian politics has a strong focus on cooperating. In 1935 there was an agreement 
between the Labor Party and the Farmer’s Party on how to deal with the consequences of the 
Great Depression. This led to the establishment of cooperation between the two largest social 
classes in the society ( Gustafsson, 2007, Skirbekk, 2010). The social democrats accepted that 
there would be no revolution and “recognized the legality of Parliamentarianism” (Ihlen & 
von Weltzien Hoivik, 2015, p. 114). 
Secondly, the unions and the employers’ association signed a Basic Agreement in 1935 
on how to handle labor conflicts, standards on working hours, paid vacation and protection 
against unwarranted redundancies. The agreement “may be seen as results of compromises 
between contradictory interests and normative and ideological positions. It reflects that no 
parties had achieved a full breakthrough for their principal points of view” (Heiret, 2012, p. 
50).  
In addition to these two events, came the “disasters of the interwar decades – the 
missed opportunities of the 1918, the great depression […], the waste of unemployment, the 
inequalities and inefficiencies of laissez-faire capitalism […], the brazen indifference of an 
arrogant ruling elite and the incompetence of an inadequate political class” (Judt, 2010, p. 
67). Together, these events put pressure on liberalism. “The society was perceived as a unity 
in which people most deeply constituted a community, but where diverse groups existed with 
their own interests, and these groups were entitled to make claims and organize themselves” 
(Kjeldstadli, 2005, p. 277). The government had to ensure “that the whole was overriding the 
single parts and that ‘third parties’ should not suffer because of conflicts” (Kjeldstadli, 2005, 
p. 277). Kjeldstadli continues, “social welfare policy should protect the weakest and 
redistribute resources. Through the labor and industrial policies, one wanted to control the 
conflicts between the groups in the society.”  
The “disasters of the interwar decades” created an opportunity for the unions and the 
Labor Party to gain political control and govern the country in a socialist direction. The state 
should make plans for developing the country, including economic development. The idea 
was for the state to plan and guide the development, when both the state and the private 






crises and the [WWII] itself strengthened social and national solidarity and the quest for 
cooperation” (Thue, 2008, p. 441). This understanding of the benefits of cooperation between 
(a) different political and social groups and (b) the state and private sector became part of the 
public sentiment.  
 
4.2. In the state we trust 
The Norwegian state has direct ownership in 75 companies, of which eight are listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange (Equinor [Statoil], Telenor, Norsk Hydro, DNB, Yara International, 
Entra, Kongsberg Gruppen and SAS).1 The value of the state’s ownership in these eight 
companies was close to 29 percent of the total market value of the Oslo Stock Exchange in 
2017.2 Public expenditures have in recent years been close to five percent of the GDP,3 and 
approximately 30 percent of the workforce is employed by the government.4 Because of the 
large welfare state, taxes on revenues are high. In 2016, the tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP was 38 percent. In comparison, the tax revenues were 46 percent in Denmark, 44 in 
Sweden, and 26 in the USA, while the OECD average was 34 percent.5 
While the state in Norway has a prominent role in societal life, people’s trust in other 
people and the state is strong. Tables 2 and 3 present numbers taken from the Legatum 
Prosperity Index and the World Value Survey.  
Table 2. Confidence.  
 





Do you think that most people can be trusted? (% yes) 27.44 52.20 74.20 
Do you feel safe walking alone at night? (% yes) 69.26 82.58 88.80 
Do you have confidence in the national government? (% yes) 39.41 50.15 71.00 
Satisfied with freedom of choice? (% yes) 73.74 92.40 94.80 
Do you have confidence in the judicial system? (% yes) 48.59 74.90 88.00 
Do you have confidence in the military? (% yes) 74.48 81.80 87.00 
Do you have confidence in the honesty of elections? (% yes) 53.81 83.85 93.70 
Are the businesses and government corrupt? (% yes) 63.54 31.00 29.70 
Satisfied with living standards? (% yes) 62.35 87.23 91.80 
Source: The Legatum Prosperity Index, www.prosperity.com. Data accessed January 06, 2015. 
 
The survey shows that almost 75 percent of Norwegians think that most people can be 
trusted. In comparison, the same number was 27 percent for Europe and 39 percent for the 
                                                 
1
 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/statlig-
eierskap/id1336/ (retrieved 2018/06/21).. 
2
 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/statlig-
eierskap/id1336/) and Oslo Stock Exchange (https://www.oslobors.no/Oslo-Boers/Statistikk/AArsstatistikk). 




 SSB – Statistics Norway. https://www.ssb.no/offentlig-sektor/statistikker/offinnut/kvartal retrieved 
2018/06/21). 
4
 SSB – Statistics Norway. https://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/statistikker/regsys retrieved 2018/06/21). 
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USA. All the questions in tables 2 and 3 underscore the conclusion that Norwegians have a 
prominent level of trust and confidence in their fellow citizens. The same applies to important 
institutions in the society. Almost half of the Norwegians trust the government “Quite a lot” 
compared to 32 percent in the USA.  
An impressive share of 71 percent of the Norwegians respondents answered “yes” on 
“Do you have confidence in the national government?” In the other Nordic countries 50 
percent answered “yes”, while for Europe the number was 39 percent. This confidence also 
translates into the on corruption in society. Only 30 percent of the respondents in the Nordic 
countries believe that businesses and governments are corrupt, half the share of Europe.  
 
Table 3. Trust and Confidence.  
 
Question Norway USA 
Trust: Most people can be trusted (% yes) 73.7 39.1 
Trust: Your neighborhood (% trust completely) 47.2 9.7 
Trust: People you meet for the first time (% trust completely) 6.4 0.3 
Confidence: Justice system (% who answered ‘A great deal’) 22.1 8.4 
Confidence: The Government (% who answered ‘Quite a lot’) 49.2 32 
Confidence: Parliament (% who answered ‘Quite a lot’) 56.7 18.1 
Confidence: Parliament (% who answered ‘Not very much’) 33.8 61.4 
Confidence: The Environmental Protection Movement (% who answered ‘Quite a lot’) 63.6 46.1 
Source: World Value Survey (wave 5, 2005 -2009), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp. Data 
accessed June 29, 2018.   
 
These conclusions are supported in a more comprehensive study by Delhey and Newton 
(2005, p. 311). They find the Nordic countries are exceptional with respect to trust. The 
Nordic countries have high scores on the main variables in their model, which are ethnic 
homogeneity, Protestant religion, good government, high GDP per capita and income 
egalitarianism. High scores on these four variables are associated with a high level of trust in 
society. 
One should highlight two historical contingencies. The first is the “democratic 
capitalism Norway embraced during the 20th century, with a large and active state 
supplemented by a huge volume of small businesses (Sejersted, 1993; Grytten, 2019, pp.244-
256), as stated by Slagstad (2001, p. 529): “In ‘democratic capitalism’ a strong state is joined 
together with strong communalism, which is closely associated with the ‘petite bourgeoisie’ 
and its strong ideal on equality and democracy” The second factor is the high level of trust. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of combining ethical values 
with the resource rent from the extraction of petroleum in Norway. It is discussing arguments 
regarding why Norway has been able to manage her petroleum resources to the benefit of the 
people, which is defined by the ethical goal to build a “qualitatively better society.” The main 
argument is that the accomplishment of the Norwegian petroleum policy can be attributed to 
a set of values, built on historical traditions, resulting in “democratic capitalism”, in which 
the state plays a key role and where the trust between the state and its citizens is strong and 
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